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Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement began unfolding on 28 September 
2014, when protesters opened umbrellas to shield themselves from pep-
per spray and tear gas fired by the police. The movement folded 79 days 
later on December 15, when the authorities cleared the last “occupy” 
protesters from amid the high-rises of the glitzy Causeway Bay shop-
ping district on Hong Kong Island’s north side. For those two and a half 
months, demonstrators around the densely peopled city displayed ban-
ners, often colored bright yellow to match their umbrellas, bearing Chi-
nese and English slogans such as “I want genuine universal suffrage!” 
Hong Kong’s total population is 7.2 million; about 1.2 million people 
altogether are estimated to have taken part in the protests at various 
times and in various forms.1 
The protesters’ immediate demand, encapsulated in their call for 
universal suffrage, was for the right of citizens to choose future chief 
executives of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) 
from among candidates nominated through open and broadly accessible 
processes, rather than the proposed opaque system of rigid vetting by 
Beijing’s local Hong Kong allies on the narrowly based 1,200-member 
Nominating Committee. The roots of the outrage and discontent ran—
and still run—much deeper than a dispute over the nominations process, 
however. The protesters of 2014 demanded “genuine universal suf-
frage” because successive chief executives unaccountable to the public 
have not only been chosen undemocratically, but have behaved in ways 
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that have eroded Hong Kong’s cherished freedoms. Although protestors 
have been driven out of the streets for now, the continuing denial of 
democracy to a highly mobilized society will keep dissent boiling for 
years to come.
In seeking to explain the origins of the Umbrella Movement, one 
must point to the coming of age of Hong Kong’s vibrant civil soci-
ety. The Umbrella protesters won the 
world’s admiration not only with the 
sheer scale of the “people power” 
they put on display, but also with 
their discipline, politeness, and or-
derliness. For two and a half months, 
people contributed to the protests ac-
cording to their ability. Doctors and 
nurses organized first-aid teams. 
Able-bodied men reinforced barri-
cades and served as marshals. Semi-
retirees made and repaired makeshift 
study corners. Teachers and profes-
sors staged teach-ins. College students helped high-school students with 
their homework. Art students created umbrella-themed works, including 
a giant canvas made from umbrellas damaged by tear gas, while volun-
teers crafted umbrella memorabilia by hand. Innumerable ordinary pro-
testers brought umbrellas, face masks, helmets, tents, snacks, and even 
home-cooked meals. Whenever supplies ran low, calls for aid would 
go out via social media, and scores of supporters would swiftly turn 
up with needed items. Students, often wearing school uniforms, swept 
the streets, cleaned public toilets, and recycled garbage. No wonder the 
international media lauded the Umbrella Movement as the impressive 
effort of a self-organizing civil society.
While Hong Kong’s highly mobilized civil society will remain a 
challenge to the authorities, a society-based perspective cannot by itself 
explain why the Umbrella Movement unfolded—and then folded—as 
it did. Students of contentious politics argue that it is often state struc-
ture and state policies that inadvertently “construct” movements.2 Such 
a state-centered perspective allows us to see that it was the Hong Kong 
government’s structure and policies that gave rise to and indeed fueled 
the Umbrella Movement through its 79-day protest run.
This is not to diminish the efforts of movement organizers. The Um-
brella Movement enjoyed an intergenerational leadership formed of 
Occupy Central with Peace and Love (headed by two professors and a 
Baptist minister), the Hong Kong Federation of Students (comprising 
representatives from student unions), and a group known as Scholarism 
(comprising high-school students). Joining these new faces were veter-
an democracy activists who played supportive roles in the background. 
The Umbrella protesters 
won the world’s 
admiration not only with 
the sheer scale of the 
“people power” they put 
on display, but also with 
their discipline, politeness, 
and orderliness.
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Nevertheless, these organizers could not have produced the Umbrella 
Movement without an unintentional assist from the government. 
The Umbrella Movement, which mutated from Occupy Central, in-
volved a disruptive action unprecedented in Hong Kong politics. Large, 
vocal demonstrations are nothing new to densely urbanized, freedom-
loving Hong Kong. Since 1989, the city has held annual candlelight 
vigils on June 4 to commemorate the Tiananmen Square movement. 
Since the 1997 handover, there has been an annual democracy march on 
July 1. On that day in 2003, an estimated half-million people turned out 
to demonstrate against the government’s plan to introduce a national-
security bill as stipulated in Article 23 of the HKSAR Basic Law.3 But 
these were all one-day affairs. People rallied or marched peacefully, 
and then went home. Occupy Central, as its name indicates, aimed to 
put pressure on Chief Executive C.Y. Leung and the Hong Kong gov-
ernment he heads by having protestors block streets in the city’s main 
business district. This was controversial. Support for the goal of genuine 
universal suffrage was broad, but many felt uneasy about tactics that 
involved business disruptions. The Occupy plan had been around since 
early 2013, but as of mid-2014 its popular support remained fragile. 
Occupy Central planned a civic referendum for the latter part of June 
2014, envisioning it as a way for citizens to express their preferences 
regarding the method that should be used to fill the chief executive’s 
office. As late as the first week of June, public support appeared weak 
enough to make organizers worry that not even a hundred-thousand 
votes would be cast, thereby robbing the referendum of any legitimacy. 
Then the authorities inadvertently came to the rescue. On June 10, Bei-
jing released a White Paper that reinterpreted the “one country, two sys-
tems” model by which Hong Kong is supposed to be governed in a way 
which elevated the “one country” far above the “two systems.” Instead 
of failing for lack of interest, the civic referendum drew a huge turnout 
of 787,000 voters. 
The Hong Kong government sent a report to the central government 
in July that dismissed these voices. On August 31, the Standing Com-
mittee of the National People’s Congress (China’s legislature) in Bei-
jing handed down a harsh decision. It stipulated that the Election Com-
mittee, a body dominated by establishment representatives, would also 
serve as the Nominating Committee. The 2017 race for chief executive 
of the HKSAR would take place among a small field of two or three can-
didates, each chosen by the Nominating Committee. No one else would 
be allowed to compete. For Hong Kong’s democrats, such a vetting pro-
cedure violated the promise of universal suffrage. 
The August 31 decision cast a shadow over Hong Kong. Occupy 
Central was set to launch on October 1, China’s National Day public 
holiday. Popular support for disruptive, occupation-style protest was so 
thin, in other words, that organizers planned to launch it on a day when 
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businesses would be closed anyway. Public attention was more focused 
on the campus boycotts set for late September, when high-school and 
college students planned to skip class in protest. Given the level of pub-
lic wariness, Hong Kong’s government could have easily ignored dis-
senting voices by simply refraining from action against protesters. 
The authorities’ unintentional “construction” of the Umbrella Move-
ment via excessive force began on September 26. That day, after boy-
cotting their classes, high-schoolers from Scholarism clambered over 
the fencing put up in mid-2014 to close off Civic Square in front of the 
Central Government Offices in the Admiralty district. The square had 
been designed as an open public space, but seemed a likely protest spot 
since more than a hundred-thousand people had gathered there in 2012 
to rally against plans for introducing “national education” to nurture 
“love of the motherland” among Hong Kong’s youth.4 
The sight of police officers manhandling and arresting teenagers was 
too much for many citizens, who came out to complain in large numbers 
on September 27. Seeing this, Occupy Central’s leaders felt compelled 
to forget about October 1. They launched their movement immediately, 
and in Admiralty rather than the Central district a short distance to its 
west. 
Early on the evening of September 28, police on the scene fired 87 
rounds of tear gas. Even then, no one sensed that the Umbrella Move-
ment was about to unfurl. In fact, when news spread that the police 
would soon be using rubber bullets along with tear gas and pepper spray, 
Occupy Central organizers tried to call things off for fear of injuries. 
By then, however, the gas had roused public anger. Outraged citizens 
flooded into Admiralty to “protect those already there.” Soon, protests 
spread from Admiralty to Causeway Bay and the Kowloon Peninsula’s 
Mongkok district. As demonstrators huddled beneath umbrellas to ward 
off the blanketing clouds of noxious irritants, what foreign journalists 
would soon dub the “Umbrella Revolution” was born. 
Occupy movements’ tactics are by nature hard to sustain. After the 
initial euphoria of September 29 and 30 died down, the crowds began 
to dwindle. But then would come another burst of official violence, and 
protesters would return. On October 3, thugs (alleged by protesters to be 
acting with police complicity) attacked protesters in Mongkok. On Oc-
tober 15, seven police officers beat activist Ken Tsang in a “dark corner” 
away from the main occupy site in Admiralty. For two months, every 
episode of violence against protesters, whether by police or thugs, pre-
dictably backfired, driving more support for the otherwise controversial 
disruptive action rather than forcing protestors to go home.
Once the city’s government and pro-Beijing establishment realized 
that coercion was proving counterproductive, they switched tactics. In 
October, the authorities prompted taxicab companies to petition the 
courts for injunctions against street occupations on the grounds of dam-
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age to livelihood. Once an injunction had been granted, police officers 
would form up behind bailiffs to clear the occupied sites. 
Yet this still resulted in “poor optics” for the authorities, as could be 
seen from the events of late November in Mongkok. Faced with pha-
lanxes of police reinforcing squads of bailiffs on November 24, dem-
onstrators moved from sites covered by court orders in this bustling, 
densely packed neighborhood to nearby streets in a “fluid occupy.” 
When Chief Executive Leung called for Mongkok’s streets to return to 
normal to restore shopping, demonstrators thronged to the area in huge 
numbers as the continuing protest became dubbed the “Shopping Revo-
lution.” The police responded with pepper spray and clubs, beating and 
arresting not only protesters, but reporters and passers-by as well. The 
last street clearances, in Admiralty on December 11 and Causeway Bay 
on December 15, were handled more gently, suggesting that police had 
at last learned the value of restraint as a means to limit demonstrations. 
The Umbrella Movement thus folded with far less fanfare than had ac-
companied its opening.
Occupation’s Drawbacks
The state-centered perspective does not imply that societal actors are 
condemned to passivity. Rather, it means that protesters need to have 
a strategic understanding of the weak and strong points of the state’s 
structure. The Umbrella Movement came and went without compelling 
any concessions partly because the Hong Kong government was recalci-
trant, but also partly because protesters stuck to an inherently unsustain-
able form of protest. It is true that the disruptive action of occupying 
busy streets captured the world’s attention. Yet after the initial show 
of people power on September 28 and 29, most demonstrators were un-
ready to stay for the long haul. The most committed camped out in the 
streets, and the less committed had to make a living. The uncommitted 
gradually lost their patience, and the antagonistic grew more hostile. 
Had police and thug violence not repeatedly roused enough public anger 
to drive supporters back to the occupy sites, the Umbrella Movement 
would have folded sooner than it did. 
Street occupation was also ineffective against state structure. Protest-
ers disrupted daily life near Occupy Central sites, not the Hong Kong 
government’s ruling coalition. The chief executive needs supporters, 
meaning most crucially the elite businesspeople who dominate much of 
the economy. Hong Kong’s richest residents are also its most powerful. 
As members of the narrowly based Election Committee, they are the 
kingmakers who selected past chief executives and who will vet future 
aspirants to the office. They are so important that Chinese president Xi 
Jinping met with them a week before September 28 to shore up their 
support for the August 31 decision.5 Business elites naturally favor Bei-
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jing’s preferences, for that is where the money is. But the “follow the 
money” logic also gives Hong Kong’s humble residents some ability to 
sanction tycoons, since these figures make their fortunes not only from 
lucrative contracts with Beijing, but also from the everyday purchases 
of millions of ordinary Hong Kong citizens. Not only local magnates but 
also state-owned enterprises have reaped immense profits from Hong 
Kong. A targeted consumer boycott might make businesses rethink their 
continued collusion with the government. Protesters could not wring 
even the smallest concessions out of Chief Executive Leung, but they 
might have compelled the kingmakers to force the king’s hand.
Early in the protests, not long after the start of October, organizers 
began to circulate a growing list of pro-establishment businesses to boy-
cott.6 Activists urged the public to buy from mom-and-pop shops and 
avoid glittering malls and chain stores dominated by big businesses. Yet 
the follow-through on these economic sanctions was feeble. No one in 
Occupy ranks made the case that targeted boycotts have proven one of 
the most effective protest methods available, even in settings as brutal 
as South Africa under apartheid. And a consumer boycott, of course, 
requires no one to miss work or school, making it sustainable over the 
long term. 
With little knowledge of potentially more effective and sustainable 
alternatives, committed protesters insisted on staying at occupy sites 
until they were cleared by the police. When interviewed, occupiers re-
peatedly said, “If we retreat now, we will lose everything that we have 
been fighting so hard for.”7 Some protesters advocated more “forceful” 
escalation. A disastrous November 30 attempt to surround the Central 
Government Offices led to clashes, with police using pepper spray and 
baton charges that left some protesters bloodied and requiring medical 
attention.8 In trying the office blockade, the Federation of Students was 
right to train its ire on Hong Kong’s government, but was wrong to 
think that barring Leung and some civil servants from work for a day or 
two would affect the deep structure of that government. Worse, just as 
the excessive use of police force had backfired on the government, this 
ill-conceived protest escalation merely hastened the ebbing of public 
support for street occupations and made it easier for the police to clear 
Admiralty on December 11. 
Although the state-centered perspective explains the unfolding and 
folding of the Umbrella Movement, it also suggests that the struggle 
for genuine universal suffrage will go on until basic changes occur in 
the structure and policies of the state. The firing of tear gas set off an 
explosion of public anger on September 28 because the Hong Kong gov-
ernment had bought itself so much distrust since the handover in 1997. 
Those skeptical of the Umbrella Movement often ask: “Why the fuss 
about democracy or genuine universal suffrage? Has not Hong Kong 
preserved all its freedoms even without democracy?” This sentiment 
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sums up the political debate in Hong Kong: Can freedom survive without 
democracy? Hong Kong people, however they view the occupy move-
ment, are as one when it comes to the paramount importance of free-
dom, or what they call “Hong Kong’s 
core values.” Hong Kong people cher-
ish the rule of law, independent courts, 
impartial policing, press freedom, and 
a corruption-free civil service. Many 
who grew up in a free but undemocratic 
Hong Kong believe that they can con-
tinue to enjoy freedom in the absence 
of democracy. Umbrella Movement 
supporters, by contrast, are convinced 
that the “freedom without democracy” 
model is broken. Since 1997, successive chief executives unchecked by 
democratic accountability have eroded Hong Kong’s autonomy and its 
core values.
The first chief executive, C.H. Tung (1997–2005), did face account-
ability of a sort. He introduced the so-called accountability system, 
whereby political appointees began to replace professional administra-
tors as department heads. More notably, he attempted to push through 
the draconian national-security bill in 2003, only to find half a million 
people filling the streets in protest. He never quite regained his foot-
ing, and ended up resigning in March 2005 when Beijing signaled its 
dissatisfaction with his performance. Tung’s successor, Donald Tsang 
(2005–12), expanded his appointment power to further politicize the 
senior civil service. With the chief executive ruling through cronies, 
economics became politics by other means. In 2012, Tsang was found 
to have received junkets from business tycoons, and he remains under 
investigation for corruption. One of his top lieutenants, Rafael Hui (no 
relation to the author), was recently convicted of taking bribes while in 
office.9 
Since Leung, the third and current chief executive, took office in 
2012, he has stepped up the naming of loyal supporters to top govern-
ment posts and advisory committees. He has also been accused of taking 
payouts of HK$50 million and then $37 million from the Australian firm 
UGL without accounting for them. On his watch, the Independent Com-
mission Against Corruption has itself become the target of a corrup-
tion investigation, as testified by the case against former commissioner 
Timothy Tong. Media critics of the government have been demoted or 
fired, with some journalists subjected to nearly fatal attacks by thugs. 
The establishment’s business allies have starved prodemocracy media 
outlets of advertising revenues. Even before the Umbrella Movement, 
the police had been coming under criticism for arbitrarily arresting pro-
testers. As a common Hong Kong saying puts it, while the first two chief 
All around the world, 
freedom and democracy 
are either present 
together or absent 
together, strong together 
or weak together.
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executives tried to cook the frog in a pot of water coming slowly to a 
boil, Leung has rushed to finish the job by dramatically turning up the 
heat. Whether or not most Hong Kong people were aware of the grad-
ual erosion of freedoms earlier, the last two years have clearly brought 
about a general awakening. 
The Hong Kong government’s handling of the Umbrella Movement—
and especially the unprecedented use of so much coercion—has drawn 
particular attention. The fear is that Police Commissioner Andy Tsang 
(no relation to Donald Tsang) has turned what was once an impartial 
law-enforcement agency into a political tool that punishes democrats 
while overlooking violations by those aligned with the establishment. 
The police briskly arrested protestors involved in various clashes during 
the movement, and have summoned organizers to police stations to “as-
sist in their probe” (a form of arrest by appointment) in the aftermath. 
Yet the wheels of justice seem to be grinding much more slowly (if at 
all) in the matter of police officers who beat protesters or bystanders, not 
to mention that of thugs who were caught on film attacking journalists 
and prodemocracy activists.10
Chen Zuoer, the former deputy director of the Hong Kong and Macau 
Affairs Office in Beijing, bluntly called for a new campaign to “strug-
gle against” the forces in Hong Kong that he sees behind the Umbrella 
Movement: the law courts, the Legislative Council, mass media, uni-
versities, and secondary schools.11 The campaign has begun, with the 
University of Hong Kong being singled out as the hotbed of dissent. The 
former dean of its law school, Johannes Chan, has been subjected to an 
onslaught of attacks by pro-Beijing sources for sheltering the initiator of 
the Occupy Movement, law professor Benny Tai.12 The university’s stu-
dent magazine, the Undergrad, has been criticized for discussing “Hong 
Kong nationalism,” and openly so by the chief executive in his official 
2015 Policy Address.13 So far, the judiciary has remained staunchly in-
dependent, but activists are fearful that the mass arrests during and after 
the Occupy Central movement are meant to eventually bend the courts 
to political pressure.14 
In retrospect, the erosion of freedom in the absence of democracy is 
hardly surprising. It is no coincidence that Hong Kong is the world’s 
only case of the “freedom without democracy” model —and this unique 
case is fast disappearing. All around the world, freedom and democracy 
are either present together or absent together, strong together or weak 
together. Democracy is more than free and fair elections. It also means 
the rule of law, independent courts and judges, impartial police, a free 
press, and a neutral civil service. In other words, “democracy” is short 
for liberal democracy, with liberalism in this sense encompassing what 
Hong Kong people see as basic freedoms or core values. In the rest of 
the world, as scholars of the subject have found, it has typically been ex-
tremely difficult to consolidate democracy without freedom.15 The Hong 
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Kong case confirms this scholarly finding from a different direction: It 
is impossible to preserve freedom without democracy. This model was 
viable before 1997 only because the United Kingdom, which then held 
sovereignty over Hong Kong, was itself a democracy. The protesters are 
right: Only genuine universal suffrage can save basic freedoms and the 
rule of law. 
Umbrella Movement 2.0?
As of this writing in March 2015, the Hong Kong government con-
tinues to stand by Beijing’s August 31 decision to effectively deny uni-
versal suffrage. Prodemocracy members of Hong Kong’s Legislative 
Council are vowing to veto the August 31 decision (which requires a 
two-thirds majority), and they have just enough votes to do so. The au-
thorities want to convince Hong Kong people that they should “pocket” 
a less than ideal form of suffrage as a “gradual and orderly step” on the 
way to genuine universal suffrage in the future. 
The flaw in the government’s line is that some steps create insur-
mountable hurdles rather than take people closer to the finish line. Once 
created, any undemocratic arrangement will become increasingly en-
trenched. If the Election Committee is not reformed now, it will become 
increasingly resistant to change later. The narrowly based “functional 
constituencies” that still control half the Legislative Council’s seventy 
seats furnish a hard and object lesson. They have proven resistant to all 
attempts to phase them out, and legislators who hold these seats are un-
likely to back any reform that would force them to face direct elections. 
The Umbrella camp can block the planned “fake universal suffrage,” 
but has few options for securing genuine universal suffrage. Organiz-
ers have urged a “noncooperation campaign,” but that has amounted to 
nothing more than gestures such as paying one’s taxes in increments 
containing the digit sequence “689,” as that has been Leung’s nickname 
since the Election Committee put him into office with 689 out of 1,200 
votes. There has been no call for nonpayment of taxes, which would be 
a criminal offense. (Since the Hong Kong government depends more 
on property and profit taxes than on income levies, income-tax nonpay-
ment would little affect its operations anyway.) Unless and until the au-
thorities begin quaking at the sight of checks made out for $68.90 each, 
democrats are going to have to find better ways to induce the chief ex-
ecutive—plus the rich and powerful interests behind him—to make con-
cessions. Surveys suggest that those who are not yet committed make up 
around 40 percent of Hong Kong’s populace.16 The best way to start may 
be by informing them how, in democracy’s absence, the freedoms that 
they cherish are withering away. The premium on skillful coordination 
and effective messaging will be huge, since keeping up pressure is only 
going to become harder now that the peak excitement of the Umbrella 
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Movement has passed and Umbrella supporters have splintered in the 
aftermath.
The Hong Kong government, meanwhile, should refrain from con-
gratulating itself. The state-centered perspective is a two-edged sword. 
Leung holds most of the cards and should be able to keep the opposition 
in check by avoiding excess force and the resulting backlash. But by 
overselling the August 31 decision and prosecuting movement organiz-
ers, the government will further undermine its own credibility and could 
unintentionally mobilize opponents all over again. And such a mobiliza-
tion would come after the authorities have trained activists to become 
used to arrests, beatings, tear gas, pepper spray, and thug violence. The 
current calm is the dormancy of a volcano. Even a minor government 
misstep could ignite Umbrella Movement 2.0.
It is a mistake to see the Umbrella Movement in isolation and make 
a leap to the conclusion—as some pundits have—that it has failed. The 
reality is that Hong Kong has had a democracy movement stretching 
back into the 1980s, when Britain and China were negotiating the 1997 
handover. The Umbrella Movement is just that larger movement’s lat-
est chapter. As any reader of Nelson Mandela’s memoir, Long Walk to 
Freedom, can grasp, the struggle for democracy necessarily involves 
setbacks.17 One might have argued, for instance, that the antiapartheid 
struggle was failing when P.W. Botha’s regime imposed a state of emer-
gency in 1985, yet Mandela was president within a decade. In Hong 
Kong’s long walk to genuine universal suffrage, the youthful Umbrella 
Generation must prepare itself for a protracted struggle, but it can be 
confident nonetheless that time is on its side.
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